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Can we design a perfect democratic decision procedure?
The democratic process aims to make convincing collective
decisions on the basis of individual preferences. There are a
number of di韌�erent democratic decision procedures via which such
decisions may be reached.
In this talk at the Visions in Science Conference
(http://www.visions-in-science.org/visions/index.html) in Berlin,
Christian List (http://personal.lse.ac.uk/list/) outlines three
plausible requirements of democracy before going on to show
that no democratic decision procedure is able to meet them all at
once.
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The Enlightenment thinker Nicolas de Condorcet
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marquis_de_Condorcet) famously observed that majority
rule, our paradigmatic democratic decision procedure, has some desirable properties,
but sometimes produces inconsistent outcomes. Revisiting Condorcet’s insights in light
of recent research in social choice theory, List shows that there is a con韓�ict between
three initially plausible requirements of democracy: ‘robustness to pluralism’, ‘basic
majoritarianism’, and ‘collective rationality’.
List goes on to illustrate how for all but the simplest collective decision problems, no
decision procedure meets these three requirements at once. At most two can be met
together. This ‘democratic trilemma’ raises the question of which requirement to give up.
Since di韌�erent answers correspond to di韌�erent views about what matters most in a
democracy, the trilemma suggests a map of the “logical space” in which di韌�erent
conceptions of democracy are located.
A background paper, ‘The Logical Space of Democracy’, is available here
(http://personal.lse.ac.uk/list/PDF-ퟋ�les/LogicalSpace.pdf).
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